Supply Chain Security in High-Risk Markets

The TT Club and BSI Global Intelligence 2024 Cargo Crime Report estimates the cost of cargo theft to the global economy at over $35 billion annually. That figure covers only reported incidents. The actual loss is substantially higher.

Cargo crime is not a niche or sector-specific risk. It affects pharmaceuticals, electronics, food and beverages, fashion, automotive components, and precious metals. It operates across every continent. And it has become progressively more organised: the most serious cargo crime networks operate with the discipline and intelligence function of a mid-tier logistics company.

For organisations with supply chains that touch high-risk corridors – West Africa, Southern Africa, Latin America, and parts of Eastern Europe – supply chain security is a board-level risk management issue, not an operational detail.

Why Cargo Is Targeted and How

Information as the primary attack vector

Before a truck is stopped on a road in Lagos or a warehouse in Bogota is hit, the criminal network knows what is in the load, when it is moving, and which route it is taking. Information leakage – through insiders in the supply chain, through monitoring of logistics communication channels, or through electronic interception of tracking and communications systems – is the consistent enabler of organised cargo crime.

The 2003 Antwerp diamond theft – 100 million euros of diamonds removed from a secure vault while the security guard was on duty – was enabled by meticulous intelligence gathering by the criminal group over an extended period. The 2015 Paris Cartier lorry robbery involved a group that had tracked the movement pattern of high-value deliveries over multiple weeks before executing. These are not exceptional cases. They are representative of the intelligence-driven approach that serious cargo crime networks apply.

The implication: protecting cargo is fundamentally an information security problem, not only a physical security problem. Limiting who has access to shipment details, when they receive them, and through what channels is the most cost-effective primary mitigation for high-value loads.

Attack methods by corridor

West Africa (Lagos, Tema, Abidjan). Port-based cargo theft is an established pattern in Lagos and West African ports generally. Methods include: document fraud enabling release of goods before legitimate collection, corrupt port officials facilitating diversion, and hijacking of loads in the immediate vicinity of port exits where congestion provides cover. Bonded warehouse security is uneven; due diligence on storage facilities handling high-value cargo is essential.

Southern Africa (Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town corridors). Road hijacking of trucks carrying high-value cargo is well documented in South Africa, particularly on the N1, N3, and N4 corridors. SAPS (South African Police Service) records show that cash-in-transit vehicles and cargo trucks carrying electronics and FMCG are the primary targets. Methods include staged road incidents that force the vehicle to stop, and interception at predictable rest stops.

Latin America (Mexico, Brazil, Colombia). Mexico’s cargo crime problem is intrinsically linked to organised crime. The Secretaria de Infraestructura, Comunicaciones y Transportes (SICT) reported over 13,000 cargo robbery incidents in 2023. Cartel control of specific highway corridors, particularly in Puebla, Veracruz, Guanajuato, and Estado de Mexico, means that route selection is a security decision. In Brazil, the highway robbery rate is among the highest globally – Brazil’s ABRABRAN (National Cargo Robbery Prevention Association) data records tens of thousands of cargo robbery incidents annually. In Colombia, despite security improvements in urban areas, rural highway routes and border crossing corridors retain significant organised crime presence.

Eastern Europe and Caucasus. The BSI Supply Chain Intelligence Report 2025 identifies Moldova, Ukraine (in non-conflict areas where logistics continues), and parts of Georgia as elevated cargo crime risk environments, primarily involving document fraud and warehouse theft.

Standards: TAPA FSR and TSR

The Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) publishes two key standards relevant to supply chain security for high-value goods:

FSR (Facility Security Requirements): defines minimum physical and procedural security requirements for warehouses, distribution centres, and storage facilities handling high-value cargo. Covers perimeter security, access control, CCTV, alarm systems, visitor management, and staff vetting. Three certification tiers (A, B, C) reflect different levels of control. TAPA FSR certification is a contractual requirement imposed by many major electronics manufacturers (Apple, Samsung, Sony), luxury goods brands, and pharmaceutical companies on their third-party logistics providers.

TSR (Trucking Security Requirements): defines minimum security requirements for road transport of high-value goods. Covers GPS tracking standards (real-time, with geofence alerting and response protocols), communication requirements, parking restrictions (no overnight parking outside TAPA-approved secure facilities), driver briefing, and incident reporting.

For organisations sourcing logistics services for high-value cargo, TAPA-certified providers are the benchmark minimum. For organisations that are themselves TAPA-certified or are contractually required to be, TAPA EMEA and APAC cargo crime data (published quarterly) provides the intelligence feed that should inform security plan updates.

Road Transport Security Measures

Route planning and unplanned stops

The majority of road cargo hijackings occur during or immediately after an unplanned stop. A vehicle that stops at a non-designated location – whether due to a mechanical problem, a staged incident, or driver decision – is at its most vulnerable. Route planning should specify:

Pre-approved stopping points only: motorway service areas with good lighting and CCTV, never laybys or isolated roadside stops.

No overnight parking outside TAPA TSR-certified secure facilities or equivalent.

Fuel stops pre-planned and incorporated into the route plan.

Emergency stop protocol: if a stop is forced outside a pre-approved location, the driver contacts the control room immediately, engine stays running if safe, and a security response is activated.

GPS tracking

TAPA TSR specifies real-time GPS tracking for Class I and II shipments. The tracking requirement has operational value only if the tracking platform is monitored and the response protocol is activated on alerting. A GPS tracker that emails an alert to a logistics manager’s inbox, to be reviewed when convenient, is not a security control.

Geofence alerts for route deviation and stop alerts for unplanned stops exceeding a defined threshold (15-30 minutes outside a planned stop is a common threshold) should trigger an immediate control room response: contact the driver, verify status, and escalate if no response within a defined window.

Driver vetting and briefing

Driver selection for high-value loads should include enhanced background checks. TAPA TSR requires driver vetting to at least a defined minimum standard. The briefing before a high-value movement should cover: the route, approved stops, communication protocols, what to do if intercepted or approached, and what not to do (do not open the vehicle for unverified individuals, do not accept assistance from unknown persons, do not discuss the load’s contents).

Information discipline applies to drivers: they should know only what they need to know to operate the route safely. They should not know the full commercial value of the load, the precise contents, or the consignee’s security arrangements.

Armed escort

Armed escort for cargo is appropriate in specific corridors where the threat assessment shows that the cargo value and organised crime threat level exceed what unarmed measures can adequately address. In practical terms, this applies to high-value loads moving through parts of Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, West Africa, and Southern Africa.

The decision requires a route-specific threat assessment by someone with current intelligence on that corridor. Armed escort is not a blanket risk management response – it introduces escalation risks and can make a load more visible as a high-value target. The security consultant advising on armed escort should be operating in the relevant market and have current knowledge of licensed providers.

Insider Threat in Logistics

TT Club cargo crime data consistently shows that insider facilitation is present in a significant proportion of organised cargo theft. Warehouse staff, logistics planners, and drivers who pass movement information to criminal networks – whether under coercion, financial inducement, or both – are a structural vulnerability.

Pre-employment vetting reduces insider risk but does not eliminate it. The structural mitigations that complement vetting:

Need-to-know compartmentalisation: movement details shared with staff on a strict need-to-know basis, as close to the execution date as operationally possible.

Segregation of planning and execution roles: the person who plans a high-value movement should not be the same person who confirms all operational details to the driver.

Anomaly monitoring: late changes to vehicle routing, last-minute driver substitutions, and unexplained communication outside normal patterns are worth examining.

Pharmaceutical and Cold Chain Cargo

Pharmaceutical cargo presents a combined challenge: the standard supply chain security requirements apply, and cold chain integrity (temperature monitoring) must be maintained throughout. The cargo crime threat for pharmaceuticals is high – resale value is significant, and pharmaceutical cargo often moves through the same high-risk corridors as electronics. The security plan must integrate both requirements without compromising either. Refrigerated trailer security is a specific sub-domain with additional access control and monitoring requirements.

For construction and infrastructure projects in high-risk markets where supply chain security for materials and equipment is a project management function, see our security for construction and infrastructure projects guide. For the remote and off-grid operations context where supply chain access is itself a security challenge, see our remote operations security guide. For the specific security requirements of pharmaceutical and cold chain supply chains – covering drug theft, counterfeit medicine infiltration at the wholesale tier, TAPA CCSS standards, and clinical trial material transit in P1 cities – see our pharmaceutical supply chain security guide.

Source: TT Club and BSI Supply Chain Intelligence: 2024 Cargo Crime Report. TAPA EMEA Cargo Crime Statistics Q4 2024. TAPA Trucking Security Requirements (TSR) Version 3 (2023). TAPA Facility Security Requirements (FSR) Version 3 (2023). Secretaria de Infraestructura, Comunicaciones y Transportes (SICT) Mexico cargo robbery data 2023. ABRABRAN (Brazil National Cargo Robbery Prevention Association) Annual Report 2024. BSI Supply Chain Intelligence Report 2025. Control Risks: Supply Chain Risk Outlook 2025.